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Predeltluatlon and HWD&D Reapoulblllty.

Predestination and Human Responsibility.
The aaortion of an irrational factor in tho doctrine of prmtiution has been the reply of our Church both to the Oabinistic and tbe
IQ'Dergiatic antitheses. Benson ia incapable of bridging the ga]f between apecial election nod univeraal grace. Our alii prae alur Oar
euoy does not presumo to offer an answer. lgnora.m,u olqu, i,aoNbim11a. But the transcendent nature of the probloml) thus railed is
wortliy of investigation, not so much for tho purpoao of aatiaqing om
reason, thwarted at this point, but for the purpoao of recopmq the
unfathomable depth of the problem and the acopc, of ita effect on om
conceptions of human personality and divine foroknowledga.

I.
Poraonality involves free will and moral responsibility. Di'fine
foroknowledgo in,•olvca Neccsaity,2) the doctrine that nothing is COD•
tingent (so that it cnn be or not ho), tha.t nothing ia done by a free
act of the human choice. Tbe olll88icnl expressions of Luther in his
book on Tho Bondago of tlu, lVill hero
aro
reproduced: "God foreknows nothing by contingency, but he foreaees, pmpoaea, and does all tl1ings according to me immutable, otA,rnal, and
infallible will. . . . It follows uunlternbly tbnt all things which we
do, although they may appenr to ue to bo dono mutably and contingently and oven mny be dono thus contingently by us, aro :,et in
reality dono neccssnrily and immut.nbly with respect to the will of
God. As Hie will cannot ho hindered, tho work itaolf cannot bo
hindered from being done in tho plnce, nt the time, in the meume,
and by whom He foresees and wills." (P. 38 f.) Thie abaoluteneea of
God ie not tho subject of theology. It involves "thnt secret and to-befeared will of God, wl10, according to me own counsol, ordains whom,
and such as, He wills to be receivers nnd pnrtnkcre of the preached and
offered mercy; which will ie not to bo curiously inquired into, but
to be adored with reverence ne tbe most profound ecorot of the dime

which

1) The paradox that of two contradictory propositiona both ma1 be
i" realitr true, though logically irreconcilable.
2) Luther'■ profound criticism of this term is wortll the attention of
our pblloaopher1: "I could wiah indeed that we were fuml■hed with ICIIIII
better term for this discuulon than thl1 commonlJ uaed term NIICl!llif.J,
vaed
ca1111oe rigAelr be
either with reference to the human will or
the divine. It la of a. 1ignificatlon too hanh and ill 1uitecl for thil nbject, forcing upon the mind an Idea. of compulsion and that which ii altogether contraey to will; whereas tho 1ubjcct which we are dilcalllDg,
divine or A"'411, doe■ what it don, be it good or evil, not bJ •DJ cam•
pul■lon, hut bJ mere willingneu or de■lre, aa it were, totall7 free." (ftl
BOlldoge of ll'le Wini tr., Cole-Vaughn, Eerdmana, 1931, p.39.)
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-S-,, which He reeatted unto Himaelf and keeps hidden from ua.n
(P.1TL) On the other hand, mm "is to be allowed a 'free will,' not

mrespect of thme thinga which are above him, but in respect onl7 of
thoee which are below him; that is, ho may be allowed to know that
he bu, u to hia gooda and posaeuiona, tho right of uaing, acting,
111d omitting, according to his 'free will.'" (P. 79.) "I know that
'fm will' can by nature do something; it can oat, drink, beget,
nilt, etc.'' (P. 818.) But now, "if God bo not deceived in that wlµcb
He foreknows, eo that all which Ho foreknows muat of neceBBity take
place," and if W:,clif wu right in maintaining tl1at "all things take
place from neceeeity, thnt is, from the immutable will of God"
(p. l!Ol), then what remains of human real)Onsibility, of man's perlDDali~ and will I Hero Luther acknowledges an irrational element:
IIWJi, that Kajesty does not
a.way
tako
or change this fault of tho
will in alJ,n - man's resistance to tho Gospel, - "seeing that it is
Dot in the power of man to do it, or why Ho lays that to the charge
of the will which the man cannot avoid, it becomes us not to inquire; and though you should inquire much, yet you will never find
oul" (P.173.)S)
The abaolutenC!88 of God implies necessity in all toml)Oral affairs,
human and counic. Infinite wisdom must include a perfect knowledge
fzom eternity of all existences and events. God's foreknowledge can
DOTer bo diBDppointod. All existencos and events will ho as God has
fzom eternity foreknown thorn; thereforo tho opl)Osito to what is,
and tho different from it, cannot bo; tho power to tho contrary does
not exist. Tho inference is not morely tho non-aziatcnce of a Power
to the contrary, but its i,npoattibility.
DiTino govemance and human freedom constitute an insoluble
pzoblem. Under tho aapect of God's providence, nOOOBBity; under the
aspect of human conduct, the contingence and freedom of man's
action& Nor does the concuraua, or cooperation of God in the acts
of His ercatures, with all its refinements of concura-ua generalia, apecialir, 1pecialiaaimua1 nor the distinction of nacearitaa kypoth.etica.
and ab,olutti supply moro thnn a resting-point for our thinking BB
3) The eoneurrcmco of God also in ovil act11 is t1iu11 explained by
Luther: "Since, therefore, God moves and does all in an, He neceuarily
mcm1 and don all In Satan and tho wicked man. But He BO doe■ an in
them u

tbeJ

th1111BC1lve■

arc and as Ho

flnd■

them; that 11, as they are

themaelftl aTene and evil, being carried along by that motion of the divine
cmmlpotaee, they cannot but. do what is avor■o and ovil. Ju1t Bl it ia
with a man driving a bone lame on one foot or lame on two feet; he
clrlftl him. juat 10 a■ the hone himself I■; t.bat I■, the hone move■ badly."
(P. 124.) "But whoever wiahe■ to undentand these thing■, let him think
Oaaa:
Ood worka evil in 1111, t.bat la, bJ 1111, not from the fault of
Ood, but. from the fault of evil in 1111." (P. 227 .)
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it hoven over tho ab:,u. Hoenecke diacUllell prophecy in ita 111ation to man'• freedom. Ho aay1 (DogffltJtil:, II, p. 989) : "Daa dam
koin abaoluter und darum koin unleidlichor Doterminiamm lilBt.
aeigt eine Untencheidung der Wei-.gung.'' The diatinction whim
ho urge■ i1 that between tho lloaianic and the preparator:, proplie,
ciea; a valid diatinction, - which, however, leave■ our problem 111ltouched. For what i1 more unreaaonablo than Hoenecke'1 conclwlillc
Weisaagun
also, wiewohl sie 1ich notwendig erfuellt,
1ontcmco: "Die
hebt doch dio mcnachlicho Freiheit nicht auf'' I And what ia III01'I
Scripture) I
The diflicu1ty was well ato.tcd by Rev. Stallmo.nn in BcArifl ul
Bel.:onntnia (Zwickau, 1920): "Solcho Wab1froihoit dee llenrhen ill
aeuaorlichen Wcrkcn und natuerlichen Dingcn wird auch nicht durch
ja soino Praeszienz odor soin Voramwialen
Gottca Allwisacnhoit, wozu
aller zukucnftigcn Dinge oder EreigniBBO ohne Untmachied phoert,
aufgehohcn. Fuer UDIICl'O Vcmunft bloibt bier allerdinga cin ,µi·
erklacrlichcs Gqhoimnis bcstehen, do. oincrsoits do.a unfchlbaro Vorherwiuen allcr guten wie bocscn Willenscntschlueaao dor KreatmeD
oino unbedingte und zwingendo Notwcndigkeit cleren Gott.cs
aolhen mit sich zu bringen, andercrscits
Zufoe11igkeit
die
[oontill·
Gottes Vorl1orwisaon darum aufzuheben
Entschlucsaegency] joncr
acheint."
Dr. Pieper, more succinct1y: "Wenn wir auch den Begriff des
blOl88D goettlichen Vorauswisaens festhalton, ohno damit den Begriff
der Wirkung oder Hervorbringung der voro.usgowusat.en DiDP 111
'V8l'binden, • . • 10 bleibt dabei fuer unser menschlichca Bepeifen
dennoch cine Schwierigkeit beatehen, die wir nicht beaeitigen. koennen.
Gottee unfehlbares Vorauswissen einerseits und die Ungeswunpnheit
dee menachlichen Willens und die menschliche Verantwortlichbit
andereraeita sind zwei Wohrheiten, dio wir auf Grund der Schrift
feathalten muessen, ohne dass uns in diesorn Leben die Erkenntnil
:moeglich wnere, wie beide nebeneinander bestehcn kocmnen." (CAriltZicAe Dogmal.ik, I, p. 553.) Any effort, says Dr. Pieper, to harmonim
theae two principle■ will either Nl8ult in surrendering the infallible
omniaeience of God or in yielding the autonomy (UngeatoUge11Aeit)
of the will and human reaponaibilit:, for sin.4)
4) In agreement with Luther'■ Bortdoge of tu 'WiU our Coaf•l1111
(Apoloff and J'Ot'11111la of COIICOt'II) deflnltel7 uaert natural :man'• iNIIUIJ
to aerdu choice In 1plritual matter■ and hi• GbUitJ to me hi■ will la
"outward matter■,"
In the moral· hld. The doctrine 'IIJJ&7 be 111111•
:marlud thu: 1. Kan ha■ abaolutel7 no free will wh&taoner In aplrltul
matter■• B7 aplrltual matt.en are meant the attitude of man tonrcl tM
eall of the Goepel, the preaching of repentance, God'• ofl'er of aalfttloa u
& free gift, etc., brief!:, atated: the open.tlou of the Bol:, Spirit tlanup
the mean■ of graee. Theae, natural m:ua rulata, ■lace
will hi•
alwaJB ud
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IL
Our clifllcultiea increue whon we conaider the nature of free wilt
Thu we aeroiee choice ia not to be denied. But thero eeema to be
aoocl reucm, alao 1197chologicalb', for Luther's heaitaneyl) to uee the
term free will 8"m in reference t.o man's natural endowment of
chooaing between coureee. It ia foolish t.o talk of liberty aa belonging
to will itaalf, for the will itaalf ia not an agent that baa a will; the
pnrer of chooeing iteolf baa not the power of choosing. Predicating
liberty of the will ia apt t.o lead to conceiving of the will aa separated
from the qent, or tho will is regarded aa being out of sympathy,
detached from the other faculties of the aoul. The aoul of couree ia
1111l7 tada to do and chooae the evil. 2. Thia inability of man doe■ not
datro, hi■ re■ponaibilit,. :Man i■ able to recognize the choice before him.
Be hu the capacity of knowing both good and evil and i■ conacioua of guilt
,rben he ■Im, reject■ grace, etc: Therefore man ia rc1pon1ible for the
,llolce which hi■ will makea. 3. Determini■m ia rejected. :Man ia not
a machine that work■ according to external forCC!I and cau■e11 in external
mattua. The Confcuiona refer to "the delirium of philo110phera, who
taqht that eYIJ')'thing that l1appena m1111t 110 happen and cannot happen
otherwl11 and that everytl1ing man doea, even outward thing■, be doaa b7
mmpul■ion and that ha la coerced to evil work■ and deed11, aa uneha■tity,
robbery, murder, theft, and the like.'' (Trigl., p. 787, Art. II, See. 18. See
Luther In Jl'ootnote 2, above.) 4. Man baa a. free will in external thing■
(pbJllcal acta). "In the thing11 tlmt a.re aubject to rea110n, in thoae mattera wherein man ma.y exerci110 hia ability to underatand, in the thing■
11'herein the acnae■ of man are active, therein man h111 free will to take
or leave, to do or not to do, to chooae one or the other.'' The Confeuion■
take the matter back only to the reason and intellect of man. Preexiating
r■111!11 and external influences a.re not conaidercd. They begin with the
knowledge that la found in the mind of the man, and ,tarting with thia
u a bull, they atate that in external matters man has a free will, viz., he
ii able to chooae that which his mind tells him i11 the better or which
hi■ ,rill decree■ or which his understanding ■eta up na the atrongeat
motlft. 5. Al■o in tho field of morals natural mnn baa a. certain freedom
of choice. "Of free will they teach that man'• will Ima 11ome liberty to
cboou civil righteouanea■.'' (Trigl., p. 61, Ar. 18.) "Since there is left in
human natun rea■on and judgment concerning object.a 11ubjeeted to the
HIiie■, choice between these things and the liberty and power to render
clril right.cou■neu are also left!' ( P. 335, See. 70.) Thia ie baaed upon the
coaeeptlon of man a■ a rational creature even after tho Fa.IL As aueh he
ma7 "of hi■ free will do, or ab■tain from doing, anything good or evil.''
(P.888, Art.II, Bec.19.) The line dividing ■ueh moral acts from ■piritual
thillp la clearly drawn; as a rational creature he ha■ such moral powers,
wlil■ with respect to "divine thing■" (p. 905, Bec.159) he hu neither will
1IOI' muler■tanding.

5) Luther had already adverted to the tlteologieal cW!leulty of
iq free human aete under the abaolute foreknowledge of God.
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on]y a unit. The will ia only the aoul willing. Apin, it ia manifed
that no act of the will ia without neccuity, becauae the acta of tJie
will are connected with the dictate■ of understanding. Enr7 Id of
choice or refuaal depend■ on an antecedent cauae. ThiDp Iha
represented to understanding in order to determine the choice wuul
be purpoao]eaa if the will were not dependent on the dictate■ of muleratanding. And ainco every act of the will haa a cauae, it ia mdmt
that every act of tho will ia excited by aomo motive. Thia ii mcaaary becauae it baa a necesaary connection with ita cauae. If there
ia no motive, then tho mind aima at nothing. But flYerJ' act of tJie
will muat be the effect of motive■; for volition ia not from aJIJ
aelf-determining power in the will, but ia cauaed by preri0118 inducement■. (The famoua argument of Jonathan Edward■.)
From the standpoint of pure reaaon it ahould be admitted that
the doctrine of ncceasity has wry much in ita favor. The on]J up•
menta for the doctrine of free choice are thoeo derived from COD·
aciousneaa and from conscience. Tho first runs thua: Our comcioulneu - tho mind observing ita own activity- tolla ua that we haTe
the power of chooaing between one path and another, the purchue
of one hat or another, the choice of one routo between St. Louil and
Chicago and another, etc. We are aware of acting in the light of
what we determine to bo the best reaaon. Yan ia conacioua that
he baa tho power of deciding or of withholding decision, and that,
even if he decides, ho can defer carrying hia decision or choice
into effect.
Yet auch reasoning is not as strong as it appoara to be. We are
not really conacioua of "will." ConaciousnC88 doea not di.acern certain facultica of the mind separate from their workinp; it ii onl.r
aware of the mind's opttrationa~ not of a power or faculty behind
auch operations. And to assume a "will" behind the actions of the
mind ia as little valid as assuming a substance called ''matter' behind the phenomena which we obacrve with our eyea. Furthermore,
the auumption of the poaaibility of a contrary choice ia more di!lcult
than appears on the surface. I.et it be aaaumed that tho will bu the
power of making a different or contrary choice to that which it
doea make, what follows I Either that the will c1'ooau the coutrarJ
of what it chooses, which ia nonaenae; or it doea not chooae the contrary, and then evidently there waa aomething lacking in thia contrary which was not auffieient to bring about the effect of a choice.
Tho thing actually chosen was the only poasible choice. And this
eliminate■ the freedom of tho will.
The other argument for free will ia derived from CODICieuce,
which telia ua that we are rcaponaible for our acta. Thia meBDB that
we are under no compulsion to do or to leave undone. The murderer,
the thief, can chooae to do or not to do. The law ccmaiden him
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• free moral agent. It holds him accountable. Oloaely inspected,
tbia ii of coune not a demonstration of the freedom of choice, but
.• principle baaed upon it. To urgo it ea proof for the freedom of
the will would be an intolorablo begging of the question.
Are we, then, committed to necessityl On purely rational
pound., yea. But now tho thought suggests itsolf - Is thore not
• poaibility that reason is not o. truo guide in this matterl Is it
not poaaible that the intuition which we have of a freedom of choice
and the voice of conscience supporting this intuition are truths of
• higher order than tho rational! Is it poBSible that w.e can demon1fraf1 free will and responsibility, though reason cannot supply any
proo/r And if this holds good, as I think it does, regarding the
doctrine of free will, and sinco its contradictory, necessity, is likewise demonatrablo, what will prevent ua from extending thia principle (of truths that can be demonstrated but not proved; see Footnote 1, above) to related fields, both in philosophy and theology¥

m.
As o matter of fact, Christian thought assumes both, an overruling power of God, which makes all events necessary, and n freedom
of choice, which makes us truly responsible for what we do.
Tho motives of Joaeph's brothers were perfectly clear. Their acts
were free. By their acknowledgment, Gen. 42, 21; 50, 15, the;, had
acted on their own evil intentions. Yet Joseph revools to them that
"Ood did send me boforo you to preserve life. . . • Goa sent me before you to prcaervo you o. posterity in tho ea.rth and to save your
liTeB by a great delivcranco. So, now, it was not vou that sent me
hither, but God;' Gen. 45. Tho determinacy of God's plans had not
eliminated freo choice on tho port of the brothers, os little as it
eliminated the freedom of David's net in counting tho people, 2 Sam.
24, 1; 1 Chron. 21, 1; cp. 21, 8.17.
The entire factor of prophecy enters into this problem. Regarding the suffering and death of Christ, everything was determined.
Jens was "delivered up by the determinate counsel nnd foreknowledge
of God." Yet by "wicked" hands tho Jews had token mm and crucified Him, Acts 2,23; cp. vv.36.37. The motives for the betrayal
by Judas were not so strong os to eliminate the responsibility of the
t?aitor for his act; he went and banged himself; yet the betrayal was
taken up into God's etemal plan nnd foretold in ancient prophecy,
Acts 1, 16. The gospels refer to mllnJ events in the life of Christ
with such phrases as "that the Scripture might be fulfilled"; and our
Lord Himself brings His entire Passion under the head of fulfilment
that was by absolute neeeBSity. Yet both the good and the evil persons
inTolved in the events of our Lord's life and Passion acted as free
moral agents. Everything was ''necessary,"
everything and
was free.
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The eame abarp dualiam nm■ through all the work of the Olmnla
and the mmta of the individual Ohriatian u auch. On tbe cme Jiail.
the Ohri■tim i■ aa■ured and comforted by the Jmowledp that t1la9
i■ DO detail in bis life which God has not included in His C01DIIIII
and bu predetermined
individual
born.
before the
ia
Of that,.. 111
u■ured through example and te■timony by the entire Scriptara Yd
the■e ■ame Scriptures impre■■ upon ua the neca■ity of ,,.,.,. ad
make tho cour■e of our life, tho ■ucce■a of our undertaldnp, the
e■cape from peril■, contingent upon prayer. The ■ame God who Jiu
had all things in advance i■ the God who command■ u■ to Prl1 ad
pledges Hi■ truthfulne■s to u■ for the hearing of prQ&r.
· Ia the ■pan of our life ab■olutely fixed I Of this there c■n be
no doubt what■oever. Can we do thing■ t.o ■borten or lengtlim lifel
experience
Univer■al
■ays
and to this bear■ witne■■ the "that tboa
mqc!tlt live long on the earth" in the Fourtb Commandment. Each of
the■e propo■itiona excludes the other (aa in all the eumple■ pnD
above) ; yet both are true.
Have we, then, disestabli■hed the Lnw of Contradiction which ii
fundamental .to all our renaoningf Wo have done no ■uch thing.
But we have e■tabli■hed the fact that in this field (of Neceuity ■ml
Free Will) the la,v is without force; in other word■, reason ha■ lost
it■ power.
Thi■ is a truly oat.oni■hing result of our study. Yet the Ohriltian
life runs its quiet cour■o without any conccm over tbe ab7a of
irrationality upon which it rests. The Christian repose■ hi■ hope for
the recovery from illness upon the power of God alone; yet he will
employ a physician and medicine, and rightly so. The heathen. who
are lost. have no acuaea to offer since refuse
they
wor■bip to the
true God whom they recognize in nature, Rom. 1, 19; yet we lay the
■alvation of the heathen upon the conaciencca of our people, and
rightly 10, Mark 10, 16. 10, thougb- in the light (or ■ball we IQ
darlme■a I) of pure reason - moat irrationally so.
The scope widens until all our voluntary and involuntary act,,
our habits and our character, our secular and our religiou■ emploJment■, appear, on the one l10nd, as being under necessity and, on the
other, are matter■ for which we ore truly responsible and held accountable both to God and man. The Jost sentence requires a correction. It does not only so "appear," but auch ia the actual nali,,.
Obvioua]y we have here the true reason for the irrational element in
the doctrine of predestination.
The existence of an irratio~ol factor in thia doctrine baa been
the point of controversy between those who accept the doctrine of
the Formula of Concord ond those who have supplied a rational
explanation of this mysterioua thing, either by a (Calvinistic) denial
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of 'IDlhwul grace or b7 a (QDmlriatic) denial of universal total dep-nity. You baa no longer an irrational
doctrine
element in thia
if tbca who are loet are under a decree which from everlasting conliped them to perdition; and 70u have alao eliminatod the umeallllllhle factor if you aeaume thatconduct
aome men
themaelvce with
paler willingn• under the call of grace. Now, tho Scriptures
amt the paradmical nature of this doctrine, Rom. 9, 14-Sl;
11, 88. M; cf. Phil. S, IS. 18. And our OonfC88ions reach a. point

where they bid u■ place a finger upon our lip■ and acknowledge our
inability to harmonize ovorything that i■ involved in oloction. From
thi■ conclu■ion there i■ no escape. Concede that in predestination
11'11 are dealing in a moat patent manner with the relation of Gt>d'■
foreonlination to human personality, to human :responsibility, that ia,
to the human will,- and tho inaolublo nature of the problem, it■
miat■nce to any alchemy of human rea■on or philoaophy, is evident.
Philo■ophy i■ unable to accomplish anything in this field. In
hi■ Krilili: der nine,. Vemunft, Kant hos listed tho doctrine of neceslity md free will among those which reDBOn is unable to dcol with
mec!ellfully. In parallel columns ho gives first tho logical proof for
the freedom of the will nnd then the logical argument against it in
order to demonstrate that rational thought does not operate in this
fleld-u little as our lungs operate in water or tho gills of a. fish
function in air. Dubois Roymond, 1891, mode 11 list of sovon problelDB, co■mic riddlos, insoluble by science or reason. Tho seventh is
the problem of free will. "Ionoramua" said tbo Germon scientist
ud then added "Ionorabimul" Not because tho data. are insufficient, a when we have on unsolved problem in mechanics, chemistry,
or atronomy, but bccnuso tho human mind is BO constituted that it
doel not operate in this field.
Nothing should induce us to render lCBB wido and unfathomable
the gulf which exists between the doctrine of God's forcordination
ud that of human moral responsibility; between the doctrine of
predestination and the doctrine of universal grace; between the stntement that only tho elect will be saved and tho statement that thoso
who are lost are lost by their own responsibility. Though acknowledging the truth of both propositions in each of tbeso statement■
amount■ to saying that both opposites of two contradictory judgment■
are true, that a fundamental law of thought therefore is violated,
that the thing is irrational, unreasonable,
tremendous
- though such
are involved in accepting the doctrine of the election of
rr■ce and that of full humm responsibility, wo should not be diamayed b7 the necesaity of such m acknowledgment. By making it,
we limply acknowledge a. limitation. of human. reason. which is armed at by the moat rigid logical procedure and is a clear doctrine
of the in,pired Word.
TmoooRB Gtwmm.
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